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Abstract 
The authors explore some significant developments in recent times 
regarding modern expectations of corporations and the considerable 
impact of corporations on modern society. They also focus on some of 
the most dominant corporate law theories like the shareholder 
primacy theory, the enlightened shareholder value theory and the 
stakeholder theory. They illustrate that these developments require 
broader reporting than just financial reporting as is currently 
required by law for purposes of financial statements and reports. 
They then analyse the trend of broader reporting also on social and 
environmental issues. These forms of reporting have been done under 
general descriptive terms like corporate social reporting (CSR), 
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sustainability reporting, integrated reporting and responsibility 
reporting. The question is then asked whether directors are opening 
themselves to greater liability by doing these forms of non-statutory 
reports. They compare three jurisdictions, namely Australia, 
Germany and South Africa. They conclude that the safe-harbour 
statutory provisions and some other statutory provisions in Australia 
and South Africa should be sufficient to protect directors against 
personal liability for judgment calls honestly made as long as the 
requirements of the statutory protection are present. The protection 
for directors in Germany seem to be more limited, especially in light 
of current statutory provisions requiring reporting on issues broader 
than financial issues and because of some recent developments in the 
European Union (EU) that will widen reporting obligations even 
further.  
 
1. Introduction  
Professor Mervyn King, having been involved in groundbreaking and world-leading 
corporate governance developments since the first South African King Report was released in 
1994, reflects on some of the most fundamental issues regarding corporations in modern 
times: 
The concept of value creation by corporations in the 21st century has changed. It is no 
longer looked at through a financial lens defined as the present value of discounted 
future cash flows. There is an appreciation that business is at the junction of the 
economy, society and the environment. The corporation carries on business in the 
context of these three aspects and it is important for stakeholders to be informed as to 
how it makes its money as well as how its product or service impacts on all three.1  
It is generally accepted that the financial report is critical but not sufficient to fulfill the 
purpose of corporate reporting which is to inform stakeholders in an understandable manner 
about the µstate of play¶ in a company.1 Recently additional forms of reporting like 
sustainability reporting, responsibility reporting and integrated reporting became very 
prominent and will be an important focus for the foreseeable future as will be explained in 
detail in this article. 
TKHLGHDRIµLntegrated thinking¶ has been actively promoted by the International 
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and is now promoted further under the concept of 
µIntegrated Reporting <IR>¶.2 Integrated thinking involves an acceptance that a corporation 
uses six capitals, namely financial, manufactured, human, intellectual, natural and social  
which includes the relationships with the cRUSRUDWLRQ¶VNH\VWDNHKROGHUVDQGKow the 
company makes its money.3 The latter involves its governance, its enterprise risk 
management, its strategy short, medium and long term, and its internal controls. The business 
model of the company impacts on the three aspects while the company produces a product. 
The product in turn impacts on those three aspects.4  
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 Professor Mervyn King, Speech Delivered at the ICAEW, accepting an Honorary Membership 
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3
 Professor Mervyn King, Speech Delivered at the ICAEW, accepting an Honorary Membership 
(London, 4 March 2014). 
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 Professor Mervyn King, Speech Delivered at the ICAEW, accepting an Honorary Membership 
(London, 4 March 2014). 
In this article the authors focus on the significance of integrated and sustainability 
reporting and why it is essential that corporations should embrace such reporting. We also 
discuss some of the most recent trends in this area.  
However, will integrated and sustainability reporting expose directors to risks of 
personal liability? Will directors be held liable for mere errors of judgment reflected in these 
reports? In this article the authors look at Australia, Germany and South Africa, three 
jurisdiction that recently introduced safe harbour rules, and ask whether these rules or other 
statutory provisions would protect directors against bona fide errors of judgment contained 
in, for instance, integrated or sustainability reports.  
 
2. Significant developments in recent times5 
7KHFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHGHEDWHDQGWKHµVKDUHKROGHUSULPDF\¶WKHRU\ 
The corporate governance debate became particularly prominent when the basic perception of 
the company changed. At first the only real concern for a company was the maximisation of 
profits6 for the shareholders.7 This was clearly articulated in 1919 in the US case of Dodge v 
                                                          
5
 This part is based on parts in J.J. du Plessis et al, Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition ± FORTHCOMING, November 2014) Chapters 
1 and 2. 
6
 $$ %HUOH µ7KH ,PSDFW RI WKH &RUSRUDWLRQ RQ &ODVVLFDO 7KHRU\¶ in T. Clarke (ed.), Theories of 
Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge, 2004), 
45, 49 et seq. 
7
 00%ODLUµ2ZQHUVKLSDQGFRQWUROUHWKLQNLQJFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHIRUWKHWZHQW\-ILUVWFHQWXU\¶
in Thomas Clarke (ed.), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Corporate Governance (Routledge, 2004) at 175, 181. See also Stephen M Bainbridge, The New 
Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2008), 53. 
Ford Motor8 and is a view many commentators adhered to for a considerable period of time 
and it is argued, very convincingly by David G. Yosifon, still to be the law not only in the 
rather insignificant corporate law jurisdiction of the State of Michigan ('RGJH¶V case was 
decided in the State of Michigan), but also in the leading AU corporate law State, namely in 
Delaware.9 $FFRUGLQJWR WKLVYLHZWKHVKDUHKROGHUVDUHWKHµRZQHUVRI WKHFRPSDQ\¶10 the 
primary stakeholders and most important providers of capital to enable the company to 
conduct business. This is called the shareholder primacy theory.11 Professor Mervyn King 
explains as follows12:  
                                                          
8
 Dodge v Ford Motor 1:0LFKDW0LFKµ$EXVLQHVV
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to the change of the end itself, to the reduction of profits, 
RUWRWKHQRQGLVWULEXWLRQRISURILWVDPRQJVWRFNKROGHUVLQRUGHUWRGHYRWHWKHPWRRWKHUSXUSRVHV¶)RU
an overview of 'RGJH¶V FDVHVHH/,5RWKPDQµ5H-evaluating the Basis of Corporate Governance in 
the Post-(QURQ (UD¶ in Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (PB Vasudev and 
Susan Watson eds.) (Edward Elgar, 2012) 101, pp. 110-112. 
9
 D.G. Yosifon, µ7KHODZRIFRUSRUDWHSXUSRVH¶10 Burkley Business Law Review 181, pp. 188 
ff.  
10
 See generally Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law (The University of Chicago Press, 
SEXWVHHKLVDUJXPHQWVGLVSHOOLQJWKLVµP\WK¶RQ-47. 
11
 6HHJHQHUDOO\RQWKHWKHRU\RIµVKDUHKROGHUSULPDF\¶,(VVHURecognition of Various Stakeholder 
,QWHUHVWVLQWKH&RPSDQ\0DQDJHPHQW&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG'LUHFWRUV¶'XWLHV (VDM 
Verlag Dr Müller, 2009). Pp.19±23. 
12
 Professor Mervyn King, Speech Delivered at the ICAEW, accepting Honorary Membership 
(London, 4 March 2014). 
µ7KLV SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH VKDUHKROGHU EHLQJ WKH µRZQHU¶ RI D FRPSDQ\ SHUVLVWHG
notwithstanding that during the 20th century, share ownership became dispersed 
among many institutions with their ultimate beneficiaries unknown. Right to the end 
of the 20th century, in the Anglo-American business world, it was believed that 
corporations should be governed according to the principle of shareholder primacy. It 
is to be noted, with respect, that the shareholder primacy theory was advocated by 
economists and not by lawyers or accountants. It should also be noted that the 
company is a legal entity and a person in its own right. Slavery was abolished a long 
time ago. A person cannot be owned. Shareholders have a conglomeration of very 
important incorporeal rights which entitle them to determine the purposes of the 
company, vote for the appointment of  directors, remove directors, institute action 
against directors for breach of fiduciary duties (if the company does not agree to do 
so) and to receive a dividend if the board has declared one, but it is not correct to say 
that they µRZQ¶WKHFRPSDQ\¶ 
2.2 Moving awD\IURPWKHµVKDUHKROGHUSULPDF\¶WKHRU\WRWKHµHQOLJKWHQHGVKDUHKROGHU
YDOXH¶WKHRU\ 
*UDGXDOO\ WKH µVKDUHKROGHU VXSUHPDF\¶13 view changed, and the company, especially the 
large public company, came to be seen in a different light. It was observed more pertinently 
that there were other stakeholders of a company, too; that if the only purpose of a company 
ZDVµWKHPD[LPLVDWLRQRISURILWVIRUWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶VRFLHW\FRXOGVXIIHUWUHPHQGRXVO\± 
poor working conditions for workers, exploitation of natural assets, pollution and so on. 14 
Society and natural assets would be subsidising the corporation and its µowners¶. 
                                                          
13
 See generally Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law (2006), pp. 2 and 44-46. 
14
 See also K.H. Baker and J.RR Nofsinger, µSocially Responsible Finance and Investing: An 
Overview¶ in K.H. Baker and J. R. Nofsinger (eds), Socially Responsible Finance and Investing: 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµPDQDJLQJWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶WKHQFDPHWREHH[SUHVVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHVHRWKHU
interests,viz the EDODQFLQJRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶Vresponsibilities ± to workers as members of the 
company, to consumers of the goods and services it provides, and to the community of which 
it is a citizen.15 
Traditional wisdom regarding shareholder primacy16 began to be challenged more forcefully 
with statePHQWV OLNH µPDQDJHULDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WR VKDUHKROGHUV LV FRUSRUDWH ODZ¶V FHQWUDO
SUREOHP¶17 and, most recently, WKDW µ>V@KDUHKROGHU SULPDF\ WKHRU\ LV VXIIHULQJ D FULVLV RI
FRQILGHQFH¶18 Nowadays the calls ring loud for a rethinking of the traditional Anglo-
American notion of the company still relying on 18th and 19th century principles, concepts 
and notions.19 
From all of this emerged a slightly different theory, one moving away from the 
QDUURZ µVKDUHKROGHU SULPDF\¶ WKHRU\ WR ZKDW LV FDOOHG DQ µHQOLJKWHQHG VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH¶
WKHRU\ 7KH µHQOLJKWHQHG VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH¶ WKHRU\ YHU\ JHQHUDOO\ entails that productive 
relationships (with other stakeholders) can be achieved within the framework of existing 
corporate law and corporate governance concepts, in fact mDLQWDLQLQJ µVKDUHKROGHU
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Financial Institutions, Corporations, Investors, and Activists ± Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance 
(John Wiley and Sons, 2010 - 2012) Vol 612, 2.  
15
 G. Goyder, The Responsible Company (Blackwell, 1961), p. 45. 
16
 See again Esser, Recognition of Various Stakeholder Interests in the Company Management: 
&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG'LUHFWRUV¶'XWLHV (2009), pp. 19±23. 
17
 ' 0LOORQ µ1HZ GLUHFWLRQV LQ FRUSRUDWe law: communitarians, contractarians, and the crisis in 
FRUSRUDWHODZ¶Washington & Lee Law Review 1373, 1374. 
18
 /$6WRXWµ7KH6KDUHKROGHU9DOXH0\WK¶$SULOEuropean Financial Review - available 
at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2277141>. 
19
 See in particular B. Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn, 2012), pp. 164-165 and 488. 
VXSUHPDF\¶EXWHQVXULQJWKDWGLUHFWRUVSXUVXHVKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV LQDQHQOLJKWHQHGDQG
inclusive way, meaning having regard to the interests of other stakeholders, but no more than 
that.20 The principal manifestation of this theory is found in section 172 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006:21 
172 Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to ² 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
EWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHPSOR\HHV 
FWKHQHHGWRIRVWHUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKips with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
GWKHLPSDFWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VRSHUDWLRQVRQWKHFRPPXQLW\DQGWKH
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
                                                          
20
 6HHJHQHUDOO\'0LOORQµ(QOLJKWHQHGVKDUHKolder value, social responsibility and the redefinition 
RI FRUSRUDWH SXUSRVH ZLWKRXW /DZ¶ in Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (PB 
Vasudev and Susan Watson eds.) (Edward Elgar, 2012), 68, pp. 68 and 79-80; A. Keay, 
µ7DFNOLQJ WKH LVVXH RI FRUSRUDWH REMHFWLYH $Q DQDO\VLV RI WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V ³HQOLJKWHQHG
VKDUHKROGHUYDOXH DSSURDFK´¶  Sydney Law Review 577, pp. 589-590; I. Esser and J.J. du 
Plessisµ7KHVWDNHKROGHUGHEDWHDQGGLUHFWRUV¶ILGXFLDU\GXWLHV¶South African Mercantile 
Law Journal 346, 351-352. 
21
 See A. Keay, µ6HFWLRQ of the Companies Act 2006: An interpretation and aVVHVVPHQW¶
28 The Company Lawyer 106; Millon µ(QOLJKWHQHGVKDUHKROGHUYDOXH VRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\DQG WKH
UHGHILQLWLRQ RI FRUSRUDWH SXUSRVH ZLWKRXW /DZ¶ in Corporate Governance after the Financial 
Crisis (2012) 68, pp. 69 and 79-80. 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the 
reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
were to achieving those purposes. 
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law 
requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of 
creditors of the company. 
  
7KHµHQOLJKWHQHGVKDUHKROGHUYDOXH¶ WKHRU\FRXOGSRVVLEO\EHGHVFULEHGDV WKH LQWHULPVWep, 
EX\LQJPRUH WLPH WR UHIOHFWPRUHRQ WKH IODZVRI WKH µVKDUHKROGHUSULPDF\¶ WKHRU\DQG WKH
PHULWVRIDSURSHUµDOOLQFOXVLYHVWDNHKROGHU¶Wheory.  
2.3 7KHµVWDNHKROGHUWKHRU\¶ 
*UDGXDOO\ WKH FRQFHSW RI µFRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH¶ EHJDQ WR DGRSW D QHZ DUWLFXODWLRQ RI
µPDQDJLQJ WKH FRUSRUDWLRQ¶ ZLWK D FHQWUDO IRFXV RQ WKH LQWHUUHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ LQWHUQDO
groups and individuals such as the board of directors, the shareholders in general meeting, 
employees, chief executive officers (CEOs), managing directors, executive directors, non-
executive directors, managers, audit committees and other committees of the board. 
However, also particularly significDQWWRQRWHPRUHDQGPRUHRWKHUµVWDNHKROGHUV¶VWDUWHGWR
EHLGHQWLILHGLQFOXGLQJFUHGLWRUVDQGFXVWRPHUV,WZDVQRWORQJEHIRUHµWKHFRPPXQLW\¶µWKH
HQYLURQPHQW¶DQGµWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶ZHUHDOVRLGHQWLILHGDVµVWDNHKROGHUV¶22 
It is not difficult to motivate why all these last-mentioned stakeholders have vested 
interests in the sustainability of corporations.23 The shareholders want to maximise returns on 
their investment, not only by receiving good dividends, but also by making profits when they 
sell securities in a corporation. The employees are dependent on the company, not only to 
                                                          
22
 See J.J. du Plessis, A. Hargovan and M. Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2010), pp. 24-35. 
23
 M. King, The Corporate Citizen (Penguin Books, 2006), p. 63. 
support themselves and their families, but in some cases also as holders of employee benefits, 
including securing retirement benefits from the company. The creditors also have a strong 
interest in the sustainability of the company as their expectation is that they are paid in 
accordance with the conditions agreed upon with the corporation, while supplier±creditors are 
of necessity dependent upon corporations to continue manufacturing products and services. 
Customers want to continue trading with corporations that provide excellent goods and 
services, and they will deal with the company to enforce guarantees and warranties against 
suppliers. The communities, in which corporations do business, manufacture their goods or 
deliver their services, gain by corporations providing job opportunities and creating wealth 
that leads to the improvement of living conditions, as long as the corporations adhere to good 
corporate citizen practices with positive impacts on society and natural assets. The 
environment LV RXU µSHDUO¶ DQG LV KLJKO\ GHSHQGHQW RQ VXVWDLQDEOH DQG HQYLURQPHQWDOO\
friendly corporations. The government has an interest in the sustainability of corporations, as 
not only do they provide job opportunities to citizens, they are also responsible for  a large 
part of governmental income through taxes, levies, licenses etc., which income is eventually 
re-LQYHVWHG LQWRDFRXQWU\¶V LQIUDVWUXFWXUHKHDOWKHGXFDWLRQHWF WRHQVXUHSURVSHULW\ IRU LWV
citizens. 
1RZDGD\V LW LV IDLUO\ JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG WKDW µLQ IXWXUH WKe development of loyal, 
inclusive stakeholder relationships will become one of the most important determinants of 
FRPPHUFLDOYLDELOLW\DQGEXVLQHVVVXFFHVV¶24 WKDWµUHFRJQLWLRQRIVWDNHKROGHUFRQFHUQLVQRW
                                                          
24
 D. Wheeler and M. Sillanpää, The Stakeholder Corporation (Pitmann, 1997), p. ix. See further J. E. 
Post, L.E. Preston and S. Sach, Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder Management and 
Organizational Wealth (Stanford Business Books, 2002), pp 1± DQG0-5RH µ3UHIDFH¶ LQ00
Blair and M. J. Roe (eds), Employees & Corporate Governance (Brookings Institute, 1999), p. v. 
only good business, but politically expedient and morally and ethically just¶;25 DQGWKDWµ>W@KH
corporation as a legal entity grew out of its ability to protect not only the shareholders but 
DOVRRWKHUVWDNHKROGHUV¶26 
As a result of the recognition and acceptance of a variety of stakeholders, other 
considerations started to become more prominent than just profit maximisation for 
shareholders and these considerations include µFRUSRUDWHVRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ &6527 and 
WKH FRQFHSW RI µFRUSRUDWH FLWL]HQVKLS¶.28 The continued relevance and importance of 
compDQLHVEHLQJµJRRGFRUSRUDWHFLWL]HQV¶DQGWKDWWKH\KDYHFRUSRUDWHVRFLDOresponsibilities 
are highlighted by the sheer number of articles and books, dedicated to corporate citizenship 
and the importance of companies being good corporate citizens as well aV FRUSRUDWLRQV¶
µFRUSRUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶HVSHFLDOO\VLQFHDERXW 
 
                                                          
25
 D.S.R. Leighton and D.H. Thain, Making Boards Work (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997), p. 23. 
26
 M. Huse, Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side of Corporate Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 29. 
27
 For an explanation of the interrelationship between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), see A. Rühmkorf, The Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility in English 
Private Law, PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield (2013) at 58-62. See also See B. Sjåfjell and L. 
Anker-6¡UHQVHQ µ'LUHFWRUV¶ 'XWLHV DQG &RUSRUDWH 6RFLDO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶ LQ + 6 %LUNPRVe, M. 
Neville and K.E. Sørensen (eds.), Boards of Directors in European Companies (Wolters Kluwer, 
2013) 153 ff. 
28
 For an informative review of the history of CSR and the meaning of CSR, see R. Broomhill, 
µCorporate Social Responsibility: Key issues and debates¶ (2007) 1 Dunstan Papers 1, pp 9-11; I. 
)UHHPDQ DQG $ +DVQDRXYL µ7KH PHDQLQJ RI FRUSRUDWH Vocial responsibility: The vision of four 
nations¶ (2011) 100 Journal of Business Ethics 419. 
3. Beyond CSR: Corporate responsibility reporting (CR reporting), Integrated 
Reporting (<IR>) and sustainability reporting 
3.1 Building a better society and acting in the public good for the long term benefit of all 
stakeholders including shareholders. 
It is clear that the debate regarding the role and potential impact of companies is getting 
wider, moving away from narrower corporate social responsibilities issues to the wider issue 
of corporate responsibility generally. As is explained in a 2013 consultation paper by the UK 
Department for Business Innovation & Skills: 
Corporate responsibility ± the increasingly more acknowledged term for corporate 
social responsibility ± is the responsibility of an organisation for the impacts of its 
decisions and activities on society and the environment through transparent and 
ethical behaviour above and beyond its statutory requirements.29  
It seems as though we have truly and inevitably moved away from the view that the primary 
DLPRIFRUSRUDWLRQVLVµWRPDNHDSURILW¶RUµWRPDNHPRQH\¶30 without consideration of how 
it makes its money and the impacts of its product, to one of having 31 µresponsibility for the 
SXEOLFJRRG¶ ± sustainable value creation.32 Professor Mervyn King summarises this well:33 
                                                          
29
 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Corporate Responsibility, Consultation Paper 
(June 2013)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209219/bis-13-964-
corporate-responsibility-call.pdf> at 3 
30
 P. Hawken, The Ecology of Commerce, (Harper Business, Revised ed, 2010), pp. 1-2 makes this 
point very clear. 
31
 A.C. Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep (Irwin Law, 2005), p. 326. 
32
 Rühmkorf, The Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility in English Private Law (2013) at 18, 
fn 47, referring to M. Blowfield and A. Murray, Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 13. 
µThe board of directors, in discharging its duty of care and diligence, can no longer 
LJQRUHWKHLPSDFWZKLFKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHODQGLWVSURGXFWKDVRQVRFLHW\
and natural assets. StratHJLFDOO\WKHERDUGKDVWRHQVXUHWKDW WKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVV
model and its product enhances positive impacts and eradicates or ameliorates 
negative impacts on society and natural assets. This creates total value ± also called 
sustainable capitalism. And this is good hard-nosed business in the changed world of 
the 21st century.¶ 
3.2 Demonstrating responsible and sustainable conduct to investors 
It is based on these views that a new trend developed, namely for corporations, especially 
large public corporations, to illustrate, in a practical way, that they behave in a responsible 
way.  
Integrated reporting requires the board to apply its collective mind to those reports. 
The board must understand these reports DQGH[SODLQ µWKH VWDWHRISOD\¶ LQ WKHFRPSDny in 
clear, concise and understandable language. Such a report enables all stakeholders, including 
investors, WRPDNHDQLQIRUPHGDVVHVVPHQWDERXWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVWDELOLW\DQGVXVWDLQDELOLW\ 
The focus on the environment and the ways in which it is being used and protected,34 
with a view to maintaining long-WHUPJURZWKUHFHQWO\FRQWUDVWHGZLWKµVKRUW-WHUPLVP¶LHWKH
pressure to deliver quick results to the potential detriment of the longer-term development of 
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 Professor Mervyn King, Speech Delivered at the ICAEW, accepting an Honorary Membership 
(London, 4 March 2014). 
34
 See generally J. Dine and M. Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate Governance: The Significance of 
National Cultural Identity (Edward Elgar, 2013), pp. 56-62. 
a company)35 is of pivotal importance. Put simply, if the manner in which resources are being 
used to achieve growth now cannot be sustained, then long-term growth is not achievable. 
What is needed is long-term, sustainable growth. However, it is one thing to promote long-
term, sustainable growth, but how do we measure whether we are on the right track at the 
right pace and how do we encourage sustainable growth?  
This is where the new trends of integrated thinking and doing an integrated report 
have become particularly prominent in recent years. It is not only financial reporting that 
matters, but reporting on the long-term business success of companies and illustrating that 
companies are acting in a responsible way. As is pointed out in the Australian Council of 
6XSHUDQQXDWLRQ ,QYHVWRUV¶ $&6Is) 2013 research paper, Corporate Reporting in Australia: 
Disclosure of Sustainability Risks among S&P/ASX200 Companies, environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) issues will profoundly impact the ability of companies and their 
investors to achieve sustainable growth and prosperity into the future.36 To enable investors 
to effectively price and manage risk during their analysis of an investment, there is a need for 
relevant information, and companies need to understand the form that information should 
take37 ± that is the ultimate aim with integrated reporting to enable the user to receive 
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 Sir George Cox, Overcoming Short-termism within British Business: The Key to Sustained 
Economic Growth, Independent Review Commissioned by the Labour Party (March 2013) 
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 $XVWUDOLDQ &RXQFLO RI 6XSHUDQQXDWLRQ ,QYHVWRUV¶ 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 $XVWUDOLDQ &RXQFLO RI 6XSHUDQQXDWLRQ ,QYHVWRUV¶ $&6,V 2013 Research Paper, Corporate 
Reporting in Australia: Disclosure of Sustainability Risks among S&P/ASX200 Companies 
understandable information obtained from such reporting in order to enable members of the 
ACSI, for example, to make informed decisions whether they are investing in sustainable 
businesses.  
The sustainable reporting agenda is nowadays promoted actively internationally with 
UHPDUNDEOH SURJUHVV PDGH LQ  8QGHU WKH EDQQHU µ,QWHJUDWHG 5HSRUWLQJ ,5!¶ WKH
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)38 explains as follows: 
[Integrated reporting] is a process founded on integrated thinking that results in a 
periodic integrated report by an organization about value creation over time and 
UHODWHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJDVSHFWVRIYDOXHFUHDWLRQ«$QLQWHgrated report is 
D FRQFLVH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DERXW KRZ DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V VWUDWHJ\ JRYHUQDQFH
performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the 
creation of value in the short, medium and long term.39 
To promote consistency with integrated reporting, the IIRC released an International <IR> 
Framework on 9 December 2013. It followed a three-month global consultation led by the 
IIRC40 earlier in 2013,41 which elicited over 350 responses from every region in the world, 
the overwhelming majority of which expressed support for integrated thinking and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.acsi.org.au/images/stories/ACSIDocuments/generalresearchpublic/Sustainability%20Re
porting%20Journey%202013%20-%20public%20version.pdf> at 2. 
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 See < http://www.theiirc.org/the-iirc/structure-of-the-iirc/>. 
39
 See < http://www.theiirc.org/>. 
40
 See < http://www.theiirc.org/the-iirc/structure-of-the-iirc/>. 
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 On 26 March 2013, at the request of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), together with the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) 
DQG3Z&UHOHDVHGDEDFNJURXQGSDSHUWLWOHGµ%XVLQHVV0RGHO¶ZKLFKKLJKOLJKWVWKHEXVLQHVVPRGHODVEHLQJDW
the heart of integrated reporting. The report revealed wide variation in how organisations define their business 
models and approach to disclosure and that highlighted the need for a clear, universally applicable, international 
definition of a business model ± VHH,)6$µ&RPSDQLHV/DJJLQJRQ%XVLQHVV0RGHO5HSRUWLQJ%DFNJURXQG
3DSHU5HOHDVHGWR7DFNOHWKH,VVXH¶3UHVV5HOHDVH, 26 March 2013 <http://www.ifac.org/news-events/2013-
03/companies-lagging-business-model-reporting-background-paper-released-tackle-issu>. 
integrated report.42 Already in April 2013 the European Commission (EC) had announced the 
possible amendment to existing legislation to ensure transparency and require companies 
with more than 500 employees43 to report, in a shorter form, information on policies, risks 
and results as regards:44  
x environmental matters;  
x social and employee-related aspects; 
x respect for human rights; 
x anti-corruption and bribery issues; and 
x diversity on the boards of directors.  
Companies that do not pursue policies in relation to one or more of these matters shall 
provide an explanation for not doing so. This was taken one step further on 26 February 2014 
when it was announced that the European Parliament and Council reached agreement on the 
EC proposal of April 2013.45 In order to become law, the Commission's proposal must be 
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 6HH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ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DQG (QYLURQPHQWDO 0DWWHUV¶ 3UHVV 5HOHDVH  $SULO  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
13-330_en.htm>. 
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 (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ (8 µ'LVFORVXUH RI 1RQ-Financial Information by Certain Large 
&RPSDQLHV(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO5HDFK$JUHHPHQWRQ&RPPLVVLRQ3URSRVDOWR,PSURYH7UDQVSDUHQF\¶
Press Release (26 February 2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-
29_en.htm?locale=en>. See also European Commission (EC), Statement (Brussels, 26 February 
µ'LVFORVXUHRIQRQ-financial information by certain large companies: European Parliament and 
&RXQFLO UHDFK DJUHHPHQW RQ &RPPLVVLRQ SURSRVDO WR LPSURYH WUDQVSDUHQF\¶ DYDLODEOH DW
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-29_en.htm>. 
adopted jointly by the European Parliament and by the EU Member States in the Council 
(which votes by qualified majority). In April 2014, the European Parliament adopted the 
Directive. It will now enter into force once adopted by the Council and published in the EU 
Official Journal.46 It is expected that approximately 6,000 large companies and groups across 
the EU will be affected by the new legislation. The approach taken ensures that 
administrative burden is kept to a minimum. Companies will be required to disclose concise, 
useful information necessary for an understanding of their development, performance, 
position and impact of their activity, rather than a fully-fledged and detailed report. 
Furthermore, disclosures may be provided at group level, rather than by each individual 
affiliate within a group.47 
On 9 June 2014 the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) released its Guidance on the 
Strategic Report.48 The FRC Guidance on the Strategic Report DQGWKH,,5&¶V International 
<IR> Framework are now much closer aligned and this will ensure better quality reporting in 
the UK.49 
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(&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 European Commission 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 See FRC, Guidance on the Strategic Report, (June 2014) <https://frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Guidance-on-the-Strategic-Report.pdf>. 
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
June 2014) <http://www.theiirc.org/2014/06/09/iirc-welcomes-move-towards-better-quality-
reporting-in-the-uk/>. 
3.3 Reporting outside statutory required reporting has taken root firmly 
The eighth edition of KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2013 (released on 
10 December 2013) illustrates the wider reporting expectation, and that companies are 
starting to live up to such expectations. This edition of the KMPG Report surveyed 4,100 
companies across 41 countries and it was found that responsible reporting has evolved into a 
mainstream business practice over the last two decades, that is, reporting the financial and the 
non-financial. In the KPMG survey it was found that 71% of the companies surveyed 
undertook responsible reporting and, in particular, that there has been a dramatic increase in 
responsible reporting rates in Asia Pacific in 2012 and 2013.50  
 
4. Risks and potential liability of directors when reporting  
At this juncture it is important to pause for a moment and consider a few practical realities 
regarding risks and potential liability of directors when reporting. It is well known that there 
is a statutory duty on directors to ensure that financial reporting is done correctly. This is the 
case in all jurisdictions with developed company law and financial reporting legislation. 
There are indeed huge risks of liability for directors if the financial statements and reports of 
a company contain incorrect or misleading information. One of the most striking recent 
examples of the risks involved for directors in this area is the Australian case of ASIC v 
Healey (27 July 2011),51 also generally called the Centro case, referring to the collection of 
companies associated with the Centro property development group that started doing business 
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 KMPG, The Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2013, 
<http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Pages/corporate-
responsibility-reporting-survey-2013.aspx>. 
51
 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717 (27 July 2011) 
available at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2011/717.html>. We refer to the paragraph 
numbers of this case.  
in Queensland in Australia, but expanded rapidly and later on got involved in international 
business activities, especially in the USA. In ASIC v Healey (27 July 2011)52 the Australian 
Federal Court of Appeal held that directors and an officer of a company were liable for a 
EUHDFK RI WKHLU GXW\ RI FDUH DQG GLOLJHQFH E\ QRW SLFNLQJ XS WKDW WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ILQDQFLDO
statements incorrectly classified a large amount of current liabilities as non-current liabilities.  
The case has sent shock waves through Australia especially because of the liability of 
the non-executive directors. They were held liable irrespective of the fact that the financial 
statements were prepared in close collaboration with the auditors and the audit committee and 
the CEO recommended approval of the financial statements by the board of directors, but 
because they did not exercise proper care and diligence in scrutinising the financial 
statements they were held liable. Although the ultimate penalties for them were considered to 
EHµOLJKW¶LWZDVWKHXQGHUO\LQJSULQFLSOHVDQGSRWHQWLDORIOLDELOLW\IRUGLUHFWRUVWKDWFRQFHUQ
many Australian directors.53  
Getting back to integrated and sustainability reporting, what are the risks involved for 
directors? Will cases like the Centro case make directors reluctant to report because of the 
fear of liability?  
5. Possible forms of protection for directors 
5.1 Australia: The business judgment rule, reliance provision and power of court to 
grant relief from liability 
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$VHDUO\DVGLUHFWRUV¶GXW\RIFDUHDQGGLOLJHQFHZDVexpressed in Australian 
legislation.54 This duty was refined over time and currently it is contained in section 180(1) of 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): 
180  Care and diligence²civil obligation only 
Care and diligence²directors and other officers 
 (1) A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable 
person would exercise if they: 
 (a) ZHUHDGLUHFWRURURIILFHURIDFRUSRUDWLRQLQWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶V
circumstances; and 
 (b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the 
corporation as, the director or officer. 
Note: This subsection is a civil penalty provision (see section 1317E). 
 
It should be noted that even though the duty of care and diligence was contained in legislation 
since 1958, it was only more than 40 years later that a statutory business judgment rule or 
safe harbor rule was added to Australian legislation. There were several Reports in Australia, 
since 1989,55 WKDWUHFRPPHQGHGWKDWWKH$PHULFDQµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQWUXOH¶VKRXOGEH
introduced in Australia by way of a statutory provision56. The Cooney Report recommended 
WKDWWKHUXOHEHFRXSOHGZLWKDQREOLJDWLRQRQGLUHFWRUVµWRLQIRUPWKHPVHOYHVRIPDWWHUV
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Australian Journal of Corporate Law 152, pp. 164-165. 
UHOHYDQWWRWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶DQGDUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKH\VKRZWKDWWKH\
exerFLVHGDQµDFWLYHGLVFUHWLRQ¶RUDµUHDVRQDEOHGHJUHHRIFDUHLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶57.  
These recommendations were not adopted immediately after the Cooney Report as it 
was thought, given that the rule had been developed by the United States judiciary, its 
introduction and refinement should be left to the Australian courts58. It was also argued that 
both the American Law Institute (ALI) and the American Bar Association (ABA) had 
difficulties in formulating a statutory business judgment rule; that a type of business 
judgment rule was already recognised by the Australian courts (referring to the case of 
+DUORZH¶V Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL59); and that there was 
uncertainty as to exactly what was intended to be achieved by the introduction of a business 
judgment rule ² was it protection for directors against liability, or a lowering of the 
standards of care and diligence expected of directors60? 
It was only in 1999 that a statutory business judgment rule was enacted in Australia 
through the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Act of 1999, despite 
another wave of criticism pointing out, inter alia, that the legislation was unnecessary and/or 
XQZDUUDQWHGDQGWKDWLWZRXOGORZHUWKHVWDQGDUGVDJDLQVWZKLFKGLUHFWRUV¶DFWLRQVZHUHWR be 
judged. The business judgment rule is currently contained in section 180(2) and (3) of the 
Australian Corporations Act, 2001 (Cth):  
 
Business judgment rule 
180(2) 
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A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment is taken to 
meet the requirements of subsection (1), and their equivalent duties at common law 
and in equity, in respect of the judgment, if they: 
(a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; and 
(b)  do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; 
and 
(c)  inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they 
reasonably believe to be appropriate; and 
(d)  rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 
 The director¶VRURIILFHU¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHMXGJPHQWLVLQWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIWKH
corporation is a rational one unless the belief is one that no reasonable person 
in their position would hold. 
180(3) In this section: 
Business judgment means any decision to take or not take action in respect of 
a matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation. 
The Explanatory Memorandum made it clear that the business judgment rule would only 
operate in respect of duties under proposed subsection 180(1), that is, direcWRUV¶VWDWXWRU\
duty of care and diligence and the equivalent duty at common law or in equity, including 
common law principles governing liability for negligence. This is currently explained in the 
³1RWH´WR section 180(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth):  
This subsection only operates in relation to duties under this section and their 
equivalent duties at common law or in equity (including the duty of care that arises 
under the common law principles governing liability for negligence) ² it does not 
operate in relation to duties under any other provision of this Act or under any other 
laws. 
 
7KLVLVVLJQLILFDQWDVGLUHFWRUV¶other fiduciary duties are contained in ss 181-183 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which means that the business judgment rule cannot 
and will not protect directors against a breach of any of these duties, for instance, the duty of 
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose (s 181), and 
the duty to use their position as director to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else, 
or cause detriment to the corporation (s 182) or use information obtained as a director 
improperly to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or cause detriment to the 
corporation (s 183). The aim was clearly also to ensure that the statutory business judgment 
should not protect directors against a breach of any other statutory duty contained in the 
Corporations Act, 2001 (Cth), such as the duty to prevent insolvent trading under section 
588G.61  
5.1.1 Statutory required financial statements and reports 
Approving financial statements and reports is a statutory obligation and, as the directors have 
no discretion whether or not to have them prepared (for certain types of companies) and then 
to approve them, it has been pointed out that that WKHUHLVQRµbusiness judgment¶LQYROYHGDV
the term is defined under Australian law.62 Thus, the business judgment rule in Australia does 
not provide protection to directors for not detecting errors in the statutory required financial 
statements and reports. They would not be able to argue that the errors in the financial 
statements or reports were very difficult to detect and that they should not be liable because 
they acted in good faith and for a proper purpose; did not have any personal interest in the 
subject matter; informed themselves about the subject matter to the extent they reasonably 
believed to be appropriate; and rationally believed that the approving the financial statements 
was in the best interests of the corporation. In other words, the typical 4-layered requirement 
that would allow a director to rely on the protection of the business judgment rule.  
Under Australian law the most significant protection for directors for not detecting 
errors in financial statements and reports would probably be section 189 of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which is the provision providing protection to directors relying 
on the advice of others without having any reasonable suspicion that the advice was in fact 
incorrect or provided negligently: 
189  Reliance on information or advice provided by others 
  If: 
 (a) a director relies on information, or professional or expert advice, given or prepared 
by: 
 (i) an employee of the corporation whom the director believes on reasonable 
grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to the matters concerned; or 
 (ii) a professional adviser or expert in relation to matters that the director believes 
RQUHDVRQDEOHJURXQGVWREHZLWKLQWKHSHUVRQ¶VSURIHVVLRQDORUH[SHUW
competence; or 
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 (iii) another director or officer in relaWLRQWRPDWWHUVZLWKLQWKHGLUHFWRU¶VRU
RIILFHU¶VDXWKRULW\RU 
 (iv) a committee of directors on which the director did not serve in relation to 
PDWWHUVZLWKLQWKHFRPPLWWHH¶VDXWKRULW\DQG 
 (b) the reliance was made: 
 (i) in good faith; and 
 (ii) after making an independent assessment of the information or advice, having 
UHJDUGWRWKHGLUHFWRU¶VNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFRUSRUDWLRQDQGWKHFRPSOH[LW\RI
the structure and operations of the corporation; and 
 (c) WKHUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIWKHGLUHFWRU¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKe information or advice arises in 
proceedings brought to determine whether a director has performed a duty under 
this Part or an equivalent general law duty; 
WKHGLUHFWRU¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQRUDGYLFHLVWDNHQWREHUHDVRQDEOH unless the 
contrary is proved. 
 
The directors would potentially be protected if they relied on, for instance, information and 
SURIHVVLRQDODGYLFHIURPWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDXGLWRUVIt should, however, be pointed out that this 
section has not been the subject of in-depth judicial scrutiny, not even in the Centro case 
mentioned above.63 
There is also another form of protection for directors if it was proven that they had 
breached their duty of care and  are not protected by the business judgment rule. This 
protection is contained in section 1317S (Relief from liability for contravention of civil 
penalty provision) and 1318 (Relief from liability). Under these provisions a director can 
approach the court and request relief from liability for negligence, default, breach of trust or 
breach of duty in a capacity as such a person. The court can grant that relief if it is of the 
opinion that the person has acted honestly and that, having regard to all the circumstances of 
WKHFDVHLQFOXGLQJWKRVHFRQQHFWHGZLWKWKHSHUVRQ¶VDSSRLQWPHQW the person ought fairly to 
be excused for the negligence, default or breach. It should, however, be noted that these 
sections only apply when a breach has already been proven and it is thus one that a director 
will rely on as a last resort. At this stage they would have already suffered reputational 
damage and this form of protection will be an ill consolation in light of the legal proceedings 
the directors were already involved in, in most cases over a long period of time and normally 
at huge expenses as far as legal costs are concerned.  
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5.1.2 Integrated reporting 
Different from the statutory required financial statements and reports, integrated reporting is 
not currently a compulsory statutory obligation. Thus, the directors still have a discretion to 
do the reporting on a voluntary basis. Although there are no decided cases on this point, if a 
board of directors exercised a judgment to do  integrated reporting it will probably be seen as 
a µbusiness judgment¶ as it will probably fall within WKHPHDQLQJRIµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQW¶DV
GHILQHGLQVHFWLRQQDPHO\µ[a] decision to take « action in respect of a matter 
relevant to the business operations of the corporation¶ 
It means that, as far as integrated and sustainability reporting is concerned, the 
directors will be protected by the business judgment rule if they did  reporting in good faith 
and for a proper purpose; did not have any personal interest in the integrated reporting; 
informed themselves about the integrated reporting to the extent they reasonably believed to 
be appropriate; and rationally believed that  doing the integrated report was in the best 
interests of the corporation.  
 
Why do we say that to adopt integrated thinking and to do an integrated report is a 
business judgment call? Firstly, integrated thinking is a change in corporate behavior 
functionally and operationally and secondly an integrated report can enable the company to 
raise capital and borrow more easily and more cheaply because the provider of capital and the 
lender can measure risk on a more informed basis. Thus, the decision to do integrated and 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\UHSRUWLQJLVDQµaction in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations 
of the corporation¶DVUHTXLUHGXQGHUWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQW¶LQV 
Furthermore, this view is supported, as will be seen by the examination of the German 
business judgment rule, providing protection under comparable situations when directors 
adopt integrated thinking and doing an integrated report. 
 
5.2 Germany: The business judgment rule 
5.2.1 Duty of care 
Pursuant to section 93(2) of the German Stock Corporations Act (Aktiengesetz ± hereafter 
AktG) members of the management board who violate their duties of care to the company are 
jointly and severally liable to the company for any resulting damage. Directors are under an 
obligation to comply with the law and they therefore breach their duty of care to the company 
where they violate any statutory obligation such as the duty to produce a management 
report.64 The same applies to members of the supervisory board.65  
Statutory reporting duties that are relevant in the context of discussing sustainability reporting 
are imposed by the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch ± hereafter HGB). S289a 
of the HGB requires public companies to issue a declaration of corporate governance. It 
consists of three components: First, the declaration of past and future compliance with the 
German Corporate Governance Code pursuant to s161 AktG; secondly, relevant information 
DERXWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHSUDFWLFHVZKLFKDUHDSSOLHGEH\RQGWKHVWDWXWRU\
requirements, including a note where these can be found; thirdly, a description of the 
functioning of the management board and the supervisory board as well as the composition 
and functioning of the committees. Large corporations are also required to include 
nonfinancial performance indicators into their management report such as information about 
environmental and employee matters to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
FRPSDQ\¶VGHYHORSPHQWSHUIRUPDQFHRUSRVLWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVV66 However, the 
FDYHDWRIWKLVUHSRUWLQJGXW\LVWKHFODXVHµWRWKHH[WHQWQHFHVVDU\IRUDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI«¶
As discussed above, this reporting about nonfinancial information will be expanded under the 
proposed EU Directive discussed. 
As the duty of care requires directors to comply with the law, incorrect statements about the 
FRPSDQ\¶VSDVWUHFRUGLQWKHPDQDJHPHQWUHSRUWDUHDJURXQGIRUOLDELOLW\:LWKUHJDUGWRWKH
liability for future-looking sustainability statements, it is useful to consider the legal situation 
surrounding the statements that companies are currently required to make in their 
management report about the expected development and performance of the company in the 
future, including risks and opportunities. 
The existing duty to forecast the expected development and performance of the 
company requires an assessment of the opportunities and risks that the company faces in the 
future.67 The report must also explain the premises upon which the assessment is based. As 
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the management report has to be accurate, the forecast must be oriented at realistic 
expectations.68 It must not be misused to overstate the true business state of affairs of the 
company as far as the public and investors are concerned. It is important for directors to 
explain the premises for their forecast in order to protect themselves against liability. When 
making their assessment, the directors do not know if the company will meet its targets, so it 
is important for them to be able to demonstrate that their outline of the expected development 
of the company, including risks and opportunities was based on realistic expectations. 
If these principles are applied to forward-looking sustainability statements by 
directors, then it is clear that the directors need to take reasonable care and be cautious in 
what they report. They could otherwise be subject to liability for forecasts which are not 
based on a proper assessment of the future development and performance . The directors will 
therefore have to be careful not to unreasonably overstate what the company can achieve in 
terms of sustainable future development. Even where the forecast is not based on facts, but 
only outlining targets, strategies and their intended implementation, directors may be liable if 
they exaggerate expectations or the expectations are not based on reasonable grounds. Much 
will, in fact, depend on the circumstances of the individual case, such as the seriousness of 
the deviation between the statements made and the actual development and performance of 
the company.  But, in practice, the likely consequence of this situation is that the majority of 
directors can be expected to resort to general statements rather than making ambitious claims. 
 
5.2.2 Does the German business judgment rule sufficiently protect directors? 
Directors who face liability for breach of their duty of care as a consequence of incorrect or 
unfounded future-looking sustainability statements, will base their defence on the business 
judgment rule in section 93(1)2 of the AktG. Germany codified the business judgment rule in 
2005 based on the business judgment rule already codified in some Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.69 It is a safe harbour provisions for directors.70. 
The section provides that the duty of care (Sorgfaltspflicht) is not breached if the management 
board member, based on appropriate information, could reasonably believe that a business 
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decision was taken in the best interests of the corporation. It implies that managerial conduct 
cannot be judicially reviewed, when four prerequisites are fulfilled:71 
1. a business decision was taken (unternehmerische Entscheidung);  
2. the decision was taken in the best interests of the corporation (zum Wohle der 
Gesellschaft); 
3. the decision was taken in good faith, or, closer to the wording of the provision, the 
person could reasonably believe (vernünftigerweise annehmen durfte) that it was a 
business decision taken in the best interests of the corporation, which implies that the 
person must be unbiased and has no conflicts of interests;72 and 
4. the decision was reached based on appropriate information (angemessener 
Information) or, put more generally, an informed decision was taken.  
 
The rule clearly involves directors exercising a discretion in their decision-making. The 
underlying rationale is that business decisions relate to the future and are based on business 
plans.73 The members of the management board should not easily be liable for the failure of 
their plans, as they need to take risks. The business judgment rule in the AktG is, therefore, 
intended to provide scope for taking risks, as long as the decisions also meet prerequisites 2-3 
as listed above. 
The key issues for the applicability of the business judgment rule in the context of 
future-looking sustainability statements are: First, is the decision to publish a report a 
business decision? Secondly, did the directors base their decision on adequate information? 
With regard to the first issue, business decisions are those decisions which are taken freely, 
i.e. the directors have a choice.74 They do not have a choice where their decisions are legally 
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required by statutory provisions for instance the approval of financial statements and reports, 
the articles of association, employment contracts or internal regulations. It is therefore 
important that the directors have discretion in their decision-making.75 Insofar as the directors 
are required by law to report on sustainability issues (limited at the moment, but potentially 
more extensively in the future), it could be argued that the business judgment rule does not 
apply to statements they make in order to fulfill their statutory reporting duties. However, the 
directors still have discretion to decide whether or not to publish the report in its drafted form 
and which statements they will make, particularly those which are future-looking. Some have 
therefore criticized the view that the business judgment rule does not apply when, what is 
required of the directors to do, is required by statute, for instance the approval of financial 
statements and reports. The argument is that the view is too narrow. 76 This issue has not 
finally been decided yet. Nevertheless, based on the court cases and the views of several 
commentators, it is likely that the increased statutory sustainability reporting under the 
proposed EU Directive (see discussion under part 3.2 above) will not be covered by the 
business judgment rule as it will be considered to be a statutory obligation rather than a 
business judgment over which the directors have a discretion such as whether or not to do an 
integrated report and which specific issues they want to include in the integrated report  with 
statutory details of the financial and sustainability reports being available probably on the 
FRPSDQ\¶VZHEVLWH 
However, provided that the business judgment rule will be applicable (potentially in 
relation to integrated or sustainability reporting not required by law), directors must also 
prove that they have based their decision to publish a particular statement on adequate 
information. This condition requires the management board to use all information which is 
available objectively speaking for the particular decision.77 It is necessary to take into account 
the time available for acquiring information.78 The question if a director has based his 
decision on adequate information requires a balance between the cost of acquiring 
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information and the benefit of gaining information.79 Generally, all available sources of 
information are necessary. The director must have good reason to believe that the information 
was adequate.80 µ*RRGUHDVRQ¶DGGVDQREMHFWLYHFULWHULRQWRWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKLVTXHVWLRQ
The issuHZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµJRRGUHDVRQ¶ZLOOKDYHWREHDVVHVVHGIURPDQH[-ante view.81 
Where directors take a risk by making firm or ambitious future-looking statements 
which subsequently turn out to be unachievable, it is important that they can demonstrate that 
they have based their claims on adequate information. The crucial point will be that the 
directors can show that they have sufficiently informed themselves about the likelihood of 
achieving the promises that they make. A mere signing of sustainability reporting will, 
therefore, not be adequate. It is, however, difficult to predict to what lengths directors should 
go in preparing and publishing these reports to be covered by the business judgment rule. 
This LVRIFRXUVHQRGLIIHUHQWIURPDQ\RWKHUµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQW¶(DFKFDVHZLOl have to be 
determined on its own merits. All that can be said with certainty is that all the prerequisites of 
the business judgment rule need to be met for directors to be protected. This means that 
directors will probably be very cautious when it comes to making firm sustainability 
statements. It can be expected that, on grounds of risk, most directors will resort to rather 
general declarations. This will minimise their risk to be held liable, but it will of necessity 
diminish the usefulness of these reports as instruments for investors to determine what the 
company has achieved in terms of sustainability and what it can achieve in the future. In 
other words, to rely on integrated and sustainability reports to make informed investment 
decisions. Already, sustainability/CSR reports are often kept in rather vague terms and look 
similar. The danger of the existing liability regime is, therefore, that directors will probably 
QRWPDNHDQ\DPELWLRXVILUPVWDWHPHQWVDERXWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVXVWDLQDELOLW\JRDOVLQRUGHUWR
shield themselves from liability. This likely outcome would not be the desired aim of 
sustainability reporting in the first place. Where directors stop taking risks, the goals that they 
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pursue will be less ambitious. Consequently, directors would probably view mandatory 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\UHSRUWLQJDV\HWDQRWKHUµER[-WLFNLQJ¶DFWLYLW\UDWKHUWKDQDQRSSRUWXQLW\WR
truly reflect on their compan\¶VDELOLW\WREHPRUHVXVWDLQDEOH)RUZDUG-looking sustainability 
statements would then likely to be cautious, general and be relatively moderate, unless 
reasonable protection is provided to directors. 
Also in Germany there are some further possible forms of protection for directors in 
DGGLWLRQWRWKHEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQWUXOH6HFWLRQGHDOLQJZLWKGLUHFWRUV¶GXW\RIFDUH
AktG stipulates that the members of the management board shall not be liable to the company 
for damages if they acted pursuant to a lawful resolution of WKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJ. 
However, it is necessary that the resolution was passed prior to the act of the management 
board.82 0RUHRYHUWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJPXVWKDYHDFWHGZLWKLQLWVDUHDRIFRPSHWHQFH
The shareholders will neither be competent nor willing to pass a resolution that mandates the 
publication of certain kinds of information on sustainability or to condone incorrect 
information published. Therefore, this provision will not exclude the liability of directors for 
integrated or sustainability reporting. It should be noted here that this possible remedy under 
German law is not discussed under the Australian or South African law because in Australia 
and in South Africa a statutory derivative action could be brought on behalf of, for instance 
minority shareholders, irrespective of the fact that the wrong committed by the directors were 
UDWLILHGE\WKHVKDUHKROGHUVDWDSURSHUO\FRQVWLWXWHGVKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJ 
Directors can also be protected by the right of the company to waive or compromise a 
claim for damages.83 However, the company can only exercise these rights after the expiry of 
three years after the claim has arisen, provided that the VKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJFRQVHQWVDQG
that no minority whose aggregate holding equals or exceeds one-tenth of the share capital 
records an objection in the minutes7KLVVXEVHTXHQWH[FOXVLRQRIWKHGLUHFWRUV¶OLDELOLW\LVD
possible form of protection; however, it is subject to important safeguards.  
Finally, the management report which might soon become quite relevant for 
sustainability reporting in Germany due to the proposed EU Directive discussed above, must 
EHDXGLWHGEHIRUHLWLVSXEOLVKHG7KHFRPSDQ\¶VDXGLWRUVDUHOLDEOHWRWKHFRPSDQ\LQFDVH
                                                          
82
 S. Spindler in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th edn, Beck Verlag 2014), §93, para. 
242. 
83
 S 93(4)3 of the AktG. 
they intentionally or negligently breach their duty of care in the auditing process.84 It is 
WKHUHIRUHSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHGLUHFWRUV¶OLDELOLW\LVUHGXFHGZKHUHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDXGLWRUVKDYH
negligently failed to notice that the statements in the report were not based on proper care and 
diligence.  
 
5.3 South Africa: Safe harbour provision, reliance on information received by others 
and relief of liability by a court 
In 6RXWK$IULFDGLUHFWRUV¶GXWLHVRIFDUH, skill and diligence is contained in section 76(3)(c) of 
the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008: 
76(3) [A] director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the 
powers and perform the functions of director - «FZLWKWKHGHJUHHRIFDUHVNLOO
and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person (i) carrying out the same 
functions in relation to the company as those carried out by that director; and (ii) 
having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.  
It will be noted that, different from the Australian duty of care and diligence, the South 
African duty of care, skill and diligence retained some of the subjective considerations that 
ZHUHSDUWRIWKHFRPPRQODZ7KXVWKHµJHQHUDONQRZOHGJHVNLOODQGH[SHULHQFH¶RID
particular director could be taken into consideration to determine a breach of this duty. Thus, 
it is possible for the less knowledgeable, less skillful and less experienced director to use that 
as reasons why the director did not breach the duty of care, skill and diligence.  
In South Africa the safe harbour rule is contained in section 76(4)(a) of the South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008. Section 76(4) of the South African Companies Act 71 of 
2008 provides as follows: 
76(4) In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a company ² 
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3)(b) [acting in the 
best interests of the company] and (c) [acting with the required care, 
skill and diligence] if ² 
(i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become 
informed about the matter; 
(ii) either ² 
(aa) the director had no material personal financial interest 
in the subject matter of the decision, and had no 
reasonable basis to know that any related person had a 
personal financial interest in the matter; or 
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(bb) the director complied with the requirements of section 
75 [liability of directors and prescribed officers] with 
respect to any interest contemplated in subparagraph 
(aa); and 
(iii) the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a 
committee or the board, with regard to that matter, and the 
director had a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that 
the decision was in the best interests of the company. 
 
It will be noted that this safe harbour rule is not OLPLWHGWRµbusiness judgments¶, but expands 
to µthe exercise of the powers or the performance of the functions of directors¶ generally. 
Thus, LWLVZLGHUWKDQWKH$XVWUDOLDQEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQWUXOHWKDWRQO\DSSOLHVWRµEXVLQHVV
MXGJPHQWV¶DVGHILQHG A justification for not limiting the protection for directors to µbusiness 
judgments¶ is that it is not easy to define exactly what µbusiness judgments¶ are in 
contradistinction with µother judgments¶ that directors exercise. 'HILQLQJDµbusiness 
judgment¶ in legislation can create some difficulties because of the complexity of director 
decision-making processes. ThuVDVWDWXWRU\GHILQLWLRQRIDµbusiness judgment¶ might be 
seen as too narrow by some, but too wide by others.  
However, as far as integrated reporting is concerned, would the South African safe 
KDUERXUUXOHSURYLGHPRUHSURWHFWLRQWRGLUHFWRUVWKDQWKHQDUURZHU$XVWUDOLDQµEXVLQHVV
MXGJPHQWUXOH¶",WLVVXEPLWWHGWKDWthe answer is in the negative. As explained above, the 
decision by the board to dRLQWHJUDWHGUHSRUWLQJZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHDµEXVLQHVV
MXGJPHQW¶ In other words, it will not be the fact that the South African safe habour rule is not 
OLPLWHGWRµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQWV¶WKDWZLOOSURYLGHDGGLWLRQDOSURWHFWLRQWR6RXWK$IULFDQ
directors. What may provide additional protection to some South African directors is the 
subjective aspects85 that might be taken into consideration in determining whether there was a 
breach of the duty of care, skill and diligence. It is, however, unlikely that this form of 
protection will generally be considered as appropriate in other jurisdictions. Moving away 
IURPWKHFRPPRQODZVXEMHFWLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVWRDQREMHFWLYHDSSURDFKUHJDUGLQJGLUHFWRUV¶
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duty of care and diligence was an approach adopted since 1958 when the duty of care and 
diligence was introduced in legislation in Australia for the first time.86 
Also in South Africa, directors will be protected under certain circumstances if they 
rely on the advice from others and this will also apply to advice received and relied upon for 
purposes of integrated reporting. In this regards, section 76(4) and (5) of the South African 
Companies Act 71 of 2007 provides as follows: 
76(4)(b) In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the performance of 
WKHIXQFWLRQVRIGLUHFWRUDSDUWLFXODUGLUHFWRURIDFRPSDQ\«LVHQWLWOHGWRUHO\RQ- 
(i) the performance by any of the persons- 
(aa) referred to in subsection (5); or 
(bb) to whom the board may reasonably have delegated, formally or informally by 
course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one or more of the board¶V
functions that are delegable under applicable law; and 
(ii) any information, opinions, recommendations, reports or statements, including financial 
statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by any of the persons specified in 
subsection (5). 
 
76(5) To the extent contemplated in subsection (4)(b), a director is entitled to rely on  
(a) one or more employees of the company whom the director reasonably believes to be 
reliable and competent in the functions performed or the information, opinions, reports or 
statements provided; 
(b) legal counsel, accountants, or other professional persons retained by the company, the 
board or a committee as to matters involving skills or expertise that the director reasonably 
believes are matters- 
LZLWKLQWKHSDUWLFXODUSHUVRQ¶VSURIHVVLRQDORUH[SHUWFRPSHWHQFHRU 
(ii) as to which the particular person merits confidence; or 
(c) a committee of the board of which the director is not a member, unless the director has 
reason to believe that the actions of the committee do not merit confidence. 
 
Also under the South African law, a director can approach the court to be relieved from 
liability, but similar to the provision in Australia, it will not really be considered as an 
effective defence for directors as they can only rely on this provision after they have already 
been held in breach of a duty and they would already have been involved in litigation drawn-
out and expensive litigation by then. Section 77(9) provides as follows: 
77(9) In any proceedings against a director, other than for wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, 
the court may relieve the director, either wholly or partly, from any liability set out in this section, on 
any terms the court considers just if it appears to the court that- 
(a) the director is or may be liable, but has acted honestly and reasonably; or 
(b) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the 
appointment of the director, it would be fair to excuse the director. 
 
8. Conclusions  
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There is little doubt that internationally there is a move away from the narrow µVKDUHKROGHU
SULPDF\¶ theory. The sole aim of corporations striving for shareholder value irrespective of 
QHJDWLYHLPSDFWVRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHORULWVSURGXFWas opposed to total value is 
no longer acceptable. Nowadays, corporations, especially large public corporations, should 
have as a core aim building a better society and acting in a responsible way for the public 
good, which translate into sustainable value creation. Integrated and sustainability reporting 
is becoming of considerable importance for companies to illustrate that they are responsible 
corporate citizens striving for long-term sustainable growth.  
Having looked at the potential liability of directors in Australia, Germany and South 
Africa, the following conclusions can be drawn: In none of the jurisdictions will directors be 
able to rely on the protection of a statutory safe harbour rule when they approve statutory 
required financial statements and reports. The reason is that it is a statutory obligation to 
prepare and approve financial statements and reports and it will not be seen as something 
over which the directors have a discretion. Although the South African safe harbor protection 
LVQRWOLPLWHGWRµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQWV¶WKH6RXWK$IULFDQVDIHKDUERXU protection will also not 
be available when a mandatory statutory obligation like the approval of financial statements 
and reports is at stake.  
However, as integrated  and sustainability reporting is not yet required by way of 
statutory provisions in Australia or South Africa87, the safe harbor protection will be available 
to directors in those jurisdictions doing integrated or sustainability reports as long as the 
prerequisites for the safe harbor protection are met. 
Based on recent development in the EU, it might be that integrated or sustainability 
reporting may be required by way of statutory provisions in future. That will mean that 
directors in the EU will not be able to rely on the business judgment rule as protection as they 
would not have a discretion in making a decision whether or not to do a sustainability report. 
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 In South Africa the Johannesburg Stock Exchange requires integrated reporting only on an 
µDSSO\RUH[SODLQEDVLV¶ 
In Australia and South Africa directors could potentially be protected by the reliance 
provisions (s 189 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 76(5) of the South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008). There seems to be no equivalent provision in Germany, 
but there are other forms of protection available to directors in Germany, for example if they 
acted pursuant to a lawful resolution RIWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJRUWKHFRPSDQ\waived or 
compromised a potential claim of damages against directors.  
Based on specific statutory provisions in Australia and South Africa, a court can grant 
that relief if it is of the opinion that the person has acted honestly and that, having regard to 
DOOWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHFDVHLQFOXGLQJWKRVHFRQQHFWHGZLWKWKHSHUVRQ¶VDSSRLQWPHQW
the person ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default or breach. It was, however, 
pointed out that this remedy is a last-resort option as the directors would have already been 
involved in drawn-out and probably expensive litigation. There is no comparable statutory 
provision under German law. 
The key challenge for the protection of directors will arise if and when sustainability 
reporting becomes a statutory requirement in the EU. One possible way forward for German 
ODZZRXOGEHWRWDNHDEURDGHULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHWHUPµEXVLQHVVMXGJPHQW¶LQDZD\WKDWLW
can also be applied to those situations where directors have discretion as to how they perform 
a certain statutory duty. For example, there are different options for the writing of a 
sustainability report. Directors who take risks by making firm future-looking statements 
should be able to benefit from the protection of the business judgment rule as long as they 
can prove that they satisfy the other conditions of this rule, ie that they have based their 
decision on adequate information and that they have acted in the interests of the company. 
As long as directors in Germany, Australia and South Africa ensure that the four 
criteria for the application of the business judgment rule exist they have µQRWKLQJWRIHDU but 
fear itself¶,88 by directing the company to adopt integrated thinking and do an integrated 
report. In addition there are also other forms of statutory protection for directors, although it 
is pointed out that the protection will be narrower and the circumstances under which they 
will protect directors will be extraordinary or used as a last-resort of protection. 
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 0RVW FRPPRQO\ DWWULEXWHG WR D IDPRXV OLQH LQ )UDQNOLQ ' 5RRVHYHOW¶V ,QDXJXUDO $GGUHVV ± see 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_fear_but_fear_itself> for other comparable uses of this line.  
